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ABSTRACT
INFORMATION THEORETIC IDENTIFICATION AND
COMPENSATION OF NONLINEAR DEVICES
SEPTEMBER 2009
SEPIDEH DOLATSHAHI
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Dennis L. Goeckel and Professor Hossein Pishro-Nik
Breaking the anonymity of different wireless users with the purpose of decreasing
internet crime rates is addressed in this thesis by considering radiometric identification
techniques.
Minute imperfections and non-idealities in the different transmitter components, espe-
cially the inherent nonlinearity in power amplifiers, result in variations in their Volterra
series representations which could be utilized as a signature.
For a two user scenario, signal processing algorithms based on generalized likelihood
ratio test(GLRT) and the classical likelihood ratio test are introduced and the resulting re-
ceiver decision rules and performance curves are presented. These algorithms consider the
v
high signal to noise ratio(SNR) case where we have available the input samples completely
at the receiver which is a practical assumption for most cases.
Volterra series are widely used in behavioral modeling of power amplifiers. To validate
the existence of these variations in the Volterra series representation of power amplifiers,
process variations are introduced as major sources. The plausibility of our techniques are
justified by deriving and comparing the Volterra coefficients for the fast and slow process
corners.
Finally,an information theoretic framework is presented where the amount of mutual in-
formation of the output about the Volterra coefficients represents the amount of anonymity
taken from users. Here, some results for the low SNR case are presented to prove the
achievability of some information about individual systems using our hardware anonymity
breaking techniques.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Anonymity
Modern life with the Internet as a principal part provides different crime opportunities
and crime types. Sexual exploitation of children, production and dissemination of contra-
band music and video, intellectual property theft, murder, identity theft, financial fraud
and espionage are some instances of crimes which are either created or made easier by the
advent of computers and use of the internet. For example exploiting open wireless access
points(AP’s) hosted by private homes, businesses, and municipalities provides offenders
with de facto anonymity. Fortunately the use of computers by such offenders typically
results in digital evidence.
The primary artifacts used in investigation of internet crimes are the Internet Proto-
col(IP)address and Media Access Control address (MAC address) of the suspect’s com-
puter both of which cannot be relied on by crime investigators. Consistent IP addresses
are assigned by an Internet Service Provider(ISP)and all incoming and outgoing messages
are tagged by this IP address. The reason why IP addresses are not considered reliable is
the proliferation of open AP’s hosted by many private and public places these days. Dy-
namic IP addresses, which are temporarily assigned IP addresses from a pool of possible
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IP addresses for the duration of that internet session or for some other specified amount of
time, are most frequently assigned on LANs and broadband networks by Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) servers. They are used because it avoids the administra-
tive burden of assigning specific static addresses to each device on a network. It also allows
many devices to share limited address space on a network if only some of them will be
online at a particular time. Being temporary they are thus not considered trustworthy evi-
dence. MAC addresses are similarly unreliable as they are easily reconfigured by the user.
Another problem is the use of encrypted network connections which can be employed at
the link, network, or transport layers. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), Internet Protocol
Security(IPSec), and the Secure Shell protocol(SSH) are respective examples of these en-
cryptions. with such protection utilized, it is difficult to attribute network activities to a
particular user in terms of the content or the internet destination. In general for software
anonymity breaking techniques usually some type of software security and protection tech-
nique can be developed and thus the results of these anonymity breaking techniques are
not considered reliable evidence.
1.1.2 Imperfections at the PHY layer
In this section, we detail how we will develop new methods of collecting identifying
characteristics of radio transceivers at the physical layer — even if the higher layers pro-
vide a high degree of anonymity. The paradigm behind our approach is simple. There are
long-standing imperfections in the RF portion of any wireless transmitter that still exist
despite decades of significant efforts by the commercial and government microwave cir-
cuits community. By exploiting these imperfections, an observer can group together RF
2
Figure 1.1. Block Diagram of a Standard Wireless Transmitter, where b[n] is the sequence
of bits to be transmitted, u[n] and u(t) are the digital and analog baseband waveforms,
respectively, and x(t) is the transmitted signal.
signals from one radio that would otherwise be anonymous due to changes in MAC or IP
addresses.
An extremely simplified version of the transmit chain for a wireless transmitter is
shown in Figure 1.1. In particular, a digital (discrete-time, discrete-amplitude) baseband
signal u[n] that carries the information bits is generated by a digital signal processor (DSP).
This signal is then converted to an analog signal, which is upconverted to the desired car-
rier frequency and then amplified by the power amplifier (PA). In an ideal system, the
transmitted signal would be given by x(t) = Au(t) cos(2pifct + θ), where A is the gain
of the power amplifier, u(t) is the ideal analog form of u[n] (i.e., the sinc(·)-interpolated
version of u[n]), fc is the desired carrier frequency, and θ is the (constant) phase of the
oscillator. However:
• The digital-to-analog (D/A) conversion suffers from the finite precision of the dig-
ital input, but, more importantly, particularly for our forensics work, the analog
output for a given digital input can vary significantly across converters.
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• The oscillator, which for our work will be defined as both the crystal and the associ-
ated phase-locked loop (PLL), attempts to generate the sinusoid cos (2pifct+ θ), but
the actual frequency/phase of the sinusoid generated can vary greatly from crystal
to crystal.
• Power amplifiers, which seek to produce a linear device that takes in u(t) and puts
out Au(t) are often quite nonlinear — even with significant compensation. As with
the D/A converter and oscillator, this variation can be significant across devices.
Our approach based on radiometric identity makes use of the minor variations in ana-
log hardware of transmitters which manifest themselves as idiosyncratic artifacts in their
emitted signals.
1.1.3 Proposed Work
First, the feasibility of this approach was investigated by measuring the output fre-
quency of a couple of higher quality oscillators from manufacturer 1 and a couple of lower
quality oscillators from manufacturer 2. The results which are included in the following
sections showed empirically that there are some parameters in different transmitter compo-
nents including the center frequency of the oscillator in the mixer that could be exploited
to tell different users apart.
Next, we will pose the theoretical simplified problem of two nonlinear systems with
different system parameters(in our case Volterra series coefficients) and we will propose
algorithms to break their anonymity. The first algorithm introduced relies on General-
ized Likelihood Ratio Test(GLRT) to differentiate between the two different users in the
high signal to noise ratio(SNR) case and we will show its effectiveness.A more practical
4
algorithm which requires less storage is introduced next. This algorithm first estimates
the Volterra coefficients using least squares(LS) estimation and then solves the resulting
detection problem using the classical likelihood ratio test.
At last, we then need to form some justified proof for our claim that different amplifiers
even from the same manufacturer have different Volterra series representation vectors, far
enough to let us differentiate between them with low probability of error. This is done
by using the results of simulating a simple power amplifier and taking into account the
process variations.
1.2 Background
There are many vulnerabilities that we could
Figure 1.2. The frequencies of two oscil-
lators measured 14 times over 3.5 hours
demonstrating consistently measurable
differences and identifying characteris-
tics
exploit to perform our forensic work. We could
use non-idealities in different transmitter com-
ponents including:
Oscillator. An ideal oscillator would pro-
duce the signal cos(2pifct+ θ) at the desired fc
for a given channel. However, this is rarely the
case in practice. Instead the following signal is
produced:
y(t) = cos( 2pi(fc +∆(t))t+Θ(t) ),
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where 2pi∆(t)t + Θ(t) is the (time-varying) phase noise. The frequency offset ∆(t) has
characteristics specific to a given chip, but it is time-varying due to environmental fluc-
tuations, particularly in device temperature. When one reads the data sheets for crystal
oscillators, the numbers for this frequency offset look impressive — measured in at most
tens of and often a fraction of a “ppm” (part per million) [36]. However, when one consid-
ers a multi-GHz carrier, these offsets become significant.
We measured the frequency of each of two very good oscillators for the 2.4 GHz band
over 3.5 hours, and the results are shown in Figure 1.2. It is very clear that one could easily
group transmissions from one user together based on the carrier frequency. Furthermore,
frequency compensation is a critical synchronization function in any wireless receiver [37,
Chapter 6], and for small offsets, this frequency compensation is often done digitally at
the receiver by estimating the frequency offset and then performing compensation by mul-
tiplication by the appropriate sinusoid on the DSP. Thus, to establish communication, any
“standard” receiver for the system must be able to compute this offset within relatively
tight bounds, and hence a powerful eavesdropper could also easily track it as well.
Amplifier. An ideal amplifier would produce the signal Au(t) when given the input
u(t). However, a standard power amplifier is only linear at very low powers where it runs
quite inefficiently, and thus amplifiers in small wireless cards or cell phones, which are
what we wish to identify, are run in the nonlinear regime. Hence, compensation for this
nonlinearity has been one of the most active of all research areas for commercial RF com-
panies. Why not simply pre-compensate for the amplifier nonlinearity characteristics at
design time? Therein lies the difficulty — every amplifier, even of the same part number,
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exhibits different characteristics that have to be measured and then compensated individu-
ally for, if the amplifier linearity is to be improved [39]. Obviously, it is the uniqueness of
the characteristics that we will attempt to exploit in our proposed work.
1.2.1 Other Works
There have been a number of Radio Frequency Fingerprinting(RFF) efforts over the
years. Much of the work has been in the microwave circuit community [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], with most of it based on transient
analysis. A transient is a brief radio emission produced while the power output of an
RF amplifier goes from idle to the level required for data communication. The nature
of transients is such that they are difficult to detect and there is no obvious correct way
to succinctly describe them. The extended RFF process, including the identification of
devices, consists of four key phases. The first phase involves the extraction of features
(e.g. amplitude, phase or frequency information) from the digital signal. These features
are subsequently used to detect the start of the transient in the second phase. Once the end
of the transient has been estimated, typically in an experimental manner, the fingerprint
(features representing the transient) is obtained. Finally, the transceiver of the device is
identified based on the classification of the fingerprint.In the papers on transients in the
literature, different parts of this process has been altered. For instance in [16, 17]the
feature used in the first phase is the amplitude while in [14] the phase information is also
exploited.In [22, 15] a wavelet analysis is used to characterize the features contained in
the transient.
The term RF fingerprinting, in general, refers to various PHY layer classification ap-
proaches of RF signals. We broadly classify RF features into: (i) channel-specific ones,
7
e.g., channel impulse response, that characterize the wireless channel; and (ii) transmitter-
specific ones that are independent of the channel, e.g., signal encoding. Since channel-
specific features uniquely identify the channel between the transmitter and the receiver,
they have been successfully adopted in robust location distinction. There have also been a
few significant recent works in the networking community, through location identification(channel-
specific) [24, 25, 26, 27, 28], which would allow one to group transmissions from a sta-
tionary user. Some of these including [26, 27] are based upon the ability of the multipath
environment to provide a waveform whose structure an adversary cannot measure or model
accurately. The rapid decorrelation properties of the multipath channel is exploited. Tem-
poral and spectral variability is reflected by two notions, the coherence time and coherence
bandwidth of the channel. Spatial separation of one to two wavelengths is sufficient for
assuming independent fading paths.
Another location distinction based technique uses the Received Signal Strength (RSS)
to distinguish transmitters [25, 28]. An RSS method simply uses the RSS measured at
multiple receivers as a feature vector. RSS measurements contain information about a link
but vary due to small-scale and frequency-selective fading, such that its use in location
distinction requires multiple measurements at different receivers. Also, in the network
security application, adversaries can ‘spoof’ their signalprint using array antennas which
send different signal strengths in the directions of different access points. Moreover, for
wireless sensor networks, multi-node collaboration is expensive in terms of energy. These
location based techniques assume that different transmitters remain active and do not move
and thus lack the ability to actually make an identification or recognize a previously seen
device that moved or sat silent for some time.
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The transmitter specific RF fingerprinting techniques rely on the exploitation of de-
vice non-idealities(transmitter-specific) [30, 31, 32, 29] (see [30] for a thorough review
of prior work). Per above, approaches in the RF community generally consider very spe-
cific observed transient phenomena of the RF signal. As a representative example, Remley
et al [29] measure the envelope of a number of different wireless local area networks
(WLAN) cards and note that the envelopes of the waveforms on an oscilloscope for differ-
ent cards look different. At the other extreme, recent work by Brik et al [30] used machine
learning techniques on collected modulation data to train data-agnostic classifiers that are
then able to distinguish wireless cards that are produced by the same vendor.
On the other hand we exploit the minute imperfections in the different transmitters
hardware even from the same manufacturer that manifest themselves as the difference
in the Volterra series representations of for instance the power amplifier in the transmitter
circuitry. We suggest signal processing detection and classification techniques and support
the feasibility of out techniques theoretically. We also do not need long input vectors and
we do not have big memory requirements as out procesing is considered realtime.
1.3 Contribution
1.3.1 Formal Approach
Our broad approach to device modeling, anonymity analysis, and algorithm design is
significantly different than these prior efforts. In particular, the approach here is focused
on a comprehensive understanding and exploitation of the phenomena being exploited for
node identification. This will yield an accurate (generally statistical) model amenable to
analysis by researchers at the physical layer, thus allowing us to answer fundamental ques-
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tions: (1) how much anonymity is forfeited by such devices?, (2) what are the key device
characteristics that cause such anonymity loss?, and, particularly important from an oper-
ational point of view, (3) how might the nodes employ countermeasures to regain some
anonymity and how would such be thwarted? For example, in contrast to the recent empir-
ical classification results of [30] on commercial 802.11 cards, our modeling and analysis
could provide clear understanding of countermeasures that will be particularly effective
(likely frequency offset dithering) and those that will not (likely amplifier nonlinearity
modification). Provable performance is the key characteristic to our approach.
1.3.2 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we will discuss a simple two-user scenario in which there are only two
possible transmitters transmitting in a role and a third time one of them transmits. We
would like to determine which transmitter transmitted the third signal. For the high SNR
case, we propose two algorithms to distinguish different users.First, a Generalized Like-
lihood Ratio Test(GLRT)-based algorithm and another algorithm based on the classical
likelihood ratio test are introduced. Then, the performance of this technique by writing
the probability of error in terms of the difference vector of the two systems was studied.
Also, if we consider the coefficients to be random variables around some certain mean, the
performance of our algorithms are plotted versus the variance of these random variables.
The results of the simulations show that the average probability of error decreases when
the norm of the difference vector of system parameters increases and that the classical
likelihood ratio test performs better than the GLRT algorithm. In addition, the classical
likelihood ratio algorithm only needs to store the volterra series coefficients of the two or
more possible transmitters and is thus more practical in this sense.
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In Chapter 2, when we talk about the system parameters, we mean the truncated form
of the Volterra series coefficients. To be able to link this to the main anonymity breaking
application discussed in this introduction chapter, we need to discuss some of the sources
that cause these variations in the Volterra coefficients of different amplifiers. Chapter 3
talks about the modeling side of this project and uses the results of the simulations of
a simple class A amplifier and its variations due to the process variations of the NMOS
transistor inside the amplifier to show how different the Volterra series coefficients could
be.
Chapter 4 provides theoretical proof for the possibility of applying the hardware anonymity
breaking techniques to the low SNR case and in the mean time introduces another approach
to studying anonymity problems which is measuring the amount of information conveyed
by the output from the system parameters.
Finally chapter 5 concludes the work done in this thesis and suggests future researches
in this topic.
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CHAPTER 2
IDENTIFYING AMPLIFIERS VIA VOLTERRA COEFFICIENTS
2.1 Problem statement
Assume there are only two possible users connecting to a wireless LAN. We have
samples from the input and output of these two wireless cards. Call the input vectors of
size (M+1) X1 and X2, and their output vectors of size M, Y1 and Y2 respectively. The
transmitters in the wireless cards are in general nonlinear systems because of the nonlinear
components they have including power amplifiers(PA’s). Figure 2.1 shows another input
vector X3 passing through either system 1 or system 2. Assuming perfect errorless decod-
ing of the input we have access to X3 and Y3, the input and output, and we would like to
determine which system it went through.
2.1.1 Problem settings-high SNR case
For the high signal to noise ratio(SNR), we could accurately decode the message and
thus know X at the receiver. This input vector(X i) goes through the power amplifier
in the transmitter of the system to be identified which is characterized by its Volterra
series coefficients.Then zero mean Gaussian channel noise is added to the signal and at
the receiver the output vector Y i is received.
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 T
Input vector:
X3=[x 3[n], x 3 [n-1], …, x 3[n-M]] T
Figure 2.1. The two-system identification scenario.
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X i is the input vector of the system i known at the receiver for i=1,2,3. We consider
the (M + 1)× 1 input vector to the system i is drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian random
process with variance σ2X :
X i =


xi(n)
xi(n− 1)
.
.
.
xi(n−M)


; i = 1, 2, 3.
The M × 1 additive noise vector is also drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian random
process with variance σ2n:
νi =


νi(n)
νi(n− 1)
.
.
.
νi(n−M)


; i = 1, 2, 3.
We use the Volterra series representation with memory of order 1 for our nonlinear
devices, and we assume that the nonlinear systems are well-represented using the Volterra
series up to order two, which is called a linear quadratic system and is in the form(see
appendix A):
yi(n) = Σ
1
k1=0hi,1(k1)xi(n− k1) + Σ1k1=0Σ1k2=0hi,2(k1, k2)xi(n− k1)xi(n− k2) + νi(n)
(2.1)
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yi(n) = hi,1(0)xi(n) + hi,1(1)xi(n− 1)
+hi,2(0, 0)x
2
i (n) + hi,2(1, 1)x
2
i (n− 1) + hi,2(0, 1)xi(n)xi(n− 1) + νi(n) (2.2)
Note that this just simplifies notation. The concept applies to higher order Volterra
series.
Thus, the system parameters vector hi would be an N × 1 vector where N = 5:
hi =


hi,1(0)
hi,1(1)
hi,2(0, 0)
hi,2(1, 1)
hi,2(0, 1)


; i = 1, 2.
Now in vector form we have:
Y i =


xi(n) xi(n− 1) x2i (n) x2i (n− 1) xi(n)xi(n− 1)
xi(n− 1) xi(n− 2) x2i (n− 1) x2i (n− 2) xi(n− 1)xi(n− 2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xi(n−M + 1) xi(n−M) · · · · · · xi(n−M + 1)xi(n−M)


hi+νi
or equivalently:
Y i = Pihi + νi ; i = 1, 2.
Now that we have defined the M×N matrices Pi i = 1, 2, 3, let’s define the 2M×N
matrices P13 and P23 formed by stacking matrices P1 and P3, and P2 and P3 respectively:
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Pi3 =

 Pi
P3

 where i = 1, 2
Y i3 =

 Y i
Y 3

 where i = 1, 2
2.2 The proposed GLRT Estimation Procedure
2.2.1 The GLRT receiver
According to the generalized likelihood ratio test(GLRT test):
maxh
1
{P (Y 1,Y 3 |h1,X1,X3)}
h2
≷
h1
maxh
2
{P (Y 2,Y 3 |h2,X2,X3)} (2.3)
Given the inputs, h1, and h2 are known,
Y i3(GivenX i,X3,hi) ∼ N(Pi3.hi, σ2nI(2M×2M)), i = 1, 2.
Or equivalently:
PY
i3
|X
i
,X
3
,h
i
(Y i3|Xi,X3,hi) =
1
(
√
2piσn)2M
e
−
(Y
i3−Pi3.hi)
H (Y
i3−Pi3.hi)
2σ2n (2.4)
Now substituting these in the main GLRT formula yields:
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minh1
{(Y 13 − P13.h1)H(Y 13 − P13.h1)}
h1
≷
h2
minh2
{Y 23 − P23.h2)H(Y 23 − P23.h2)
(2.5)
Let |ei|2 be:
|ei|2 = (Y i3 − Pi3.hi)H(Y i3 − Pi3.hi) = |Y i3 − Pi3.hi|2 i = 1, 2.
Minimizing |ei|2 is the same problem as the Least Squares(LS) problem where the
number of equations to estimate the parameter is more than the number of parameters(in
this case hi’s with S = 5 elements). Thus we could apply the results of the LS problem:
hi,OPT = (P
H
i3 Pi3)
−1PHi3 Y
H
i3 , i = 1, 2. (2.6)
|ei,OPT |2 = Y Hi3(I2M×2M − Pi3(PHi3 Pi3)−1PHi3 )Y i3 , i = 1, 2. (2.7)
At the receiver the GLRT decision rule will be:
Y H13(I2M×2M − P13(PH13P13)−1PH13)Y 13
h1
≷
h2
Y H23(I2M×2M − P23(PH23P23)−1PH23)Y 23}
(2.8)
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2.2.2 Performance analysis
To determine the performance of this method and its ability to differentiate between
two different transmitters, we should find the probability of error in terms of some form of
distance between the two system parameters vectors h1 and h2.
Pe = Pr{h1}.P r{GLRT results: h2|h1}+ Pr{h2}.P r{GLRT results: h1|h2} (2.9)
Because of the symmetry:
Pe = Pr{GLRT results: h2|h1} (2.10)
We are interested in Pr{maxh1{P (Y1,Y3 |h1,X1,X3)} < maxh2{P (Y2,Y3 |h2,X2,X3)}|h1}
Or:
Pe = Pr{minh1{(Y 13−P13.h1)
H(Y 13−P13.h1)} < minh2{(Y 23−P23.h2)
H(Y 23−P23.h2)}|h1}
(2.11)
According to the definition of |ei,opt|2 in (2.7):
Pe = Pr{|e1,opt|2 < |e2,opt|2|h1} (2.12)
Pe = Pr{Y H13(I2M×2M−P13(PH13P13)−1PH13)Y 13 < Y H23(I2M×2M−P23(PH23P23)−1PH23)Y 23|h1}
(2.13)
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Knowing that the third system was actually system 1 with system parameters h1 or
equivalently substituting Y i3 by:
Y 13 =

 Y 1
Y 3

 =

 P1h1 + v1
P3h1 + v3

 = P13h1 +

 v1
v3

 (2.14)
Y 23 =

 Y 2
Y 3

 =

 P2h2 + v2
P3h1 + v3

 =

 P2h2
P3h1

+

 v1
v3

 (2.15)
yields:
|e1|2(Givenh1) = (P13h1 + v13)H(I2M×2M − P13(PH13P13)−1PH13)(P13h1 + v13) (2.16)
= vH13v13 − vH13P13(PH13P13)−1PH13v13) (2.17)
where
vi3 =

 vi
v3

 , i = 1, 2.
And, also,
|e2|2 = (

 P2h2
P3h1

+ v23)H(I2M×2M − P23XPH23)(

 P2h2
P3h1

+ v23) (2.18)
= A+B + C +D (2.19)
where:
X = (PH23P23)
−1 = (PH2 P2 + P
H
3 P3)
−1 (2.20)
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A =

 P2h2
P3h1


H
(I2M×2M − P23XPH23)

 P2h2
P3h1

 (2.21)
= (h2 − h1)HPH2 P2XPH3 P3(h2 − h1) (2.22)
= dHPH2 P2XP
H
3 P3d (2.23)
where:
d = h2 − h1 (2.24)
B = vH23

 IM×M − P2XP
H
2 −P2XPH3
−P3XPH2 IM×M − P3XPH3



 P2h2
P3h1

 (2.25)
= vH23

 P2XP
H
3 P3
−P3XPH2 P2

d (2.26)
Because of symmetry,
C = BH = dH

 P2XP
H
3 P3
−P3XPH2 P2

v23 (2.27)
D = vH23

 IM×M − P2XP
H
2 −P2XPH3
−P3XPH2 IM×M − P3XPH3

v23 (2.28)
Rewrite (2.16) in the form:
E = |e1|2 =

 v1
v3


H 
 IM×M − P1X
∗PH1 −P1X∗PH3
−P3X∗PH1 IM×M − P3X∗PH3



 v1
v3

 (2.29)
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,where X∗ = (

 P1
P3

)H(

 P1
P3

)−1 = (PH1 P1 + PH3 P3)−1
Now (2.13) results:
Pe = P{E > A+B + C +D} (2.30)
Using some algebraic manipulations, this simplifies to:
Pr{(


V 1
V 2
V 3

−


0
P2.d
0

)
H


−(I − P1X∗PH1 ) 0 P1X∗PH3
0 (I − P2XP2) P2X∗PH3
P3X
∗PH1 −P3X∗PH2 P3(X −X∗)PH3

 .(


V 1
V 2
V 3

−


0
P2.d
0

) < 0}
(2.31)
Defining the new matrices and vectors:
P =


−(I − P1X∗PH1 ) 0 P1X∗PH3
0 (I − P2XP2) −P2XPH3
P3X
∗PH1 −P3XPH2 −P3(X −X∗)PH3


B =


0
P2.d
0


V =


V 1
V 2
V 3


we get:
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Figure 2.2. Probability of error vs. the norm of the difference vectord
Pr{(V (3M×1) +B)HP(3M×3M)(V +B) < 0} (2.32)
Figure 2.2 shows the Pe versus the L2-norm of the difference vector ||d||2 averaged
over 10000 input vectors X1,X2, and X3 of size 100 and also the noise vectors v1, v2,
and v3 for the SNR=30.
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2.2.3 Supplemental performance curves
We could improve the result by using more input samples in our GLRT detection algo-
rithm. Also, apparently the probability of error decreases as the signal to noise ratio(SNR)
is increased. This way for the same amount of the norm of the difference vector(|d|), we
get less probability of error in both cases.
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Figure 2.3 shows Pe versus norm of the difference vector using different input sizes
for the estimation. Figure 2.4 shows Pe versus norm of the difference vector for different
values of the SNR.
2.3 A Simplified Algorithm Based on the Classical Likelihood Ratio
Test
We have three input/output vector pairs (X1,Y 1), (X2,Y 2), and (X3,Y 3), where
the first two pairs of input/output vectors are from nonlinear systems 1 and 2, and we
would like to determine which system does the third input/output pair belong to.
2.3.1 Receiver decision rule
It is more practical to store the estimated system coefficients(truncated Volterra series
representation of the system)hi i = 1, 2, 3 rather than having to store all the input and
output data of the first and second transmitters. Then with some suitable distance criterion
we should determine if h3 is closer to h1 or h2.
Y i =


xi(n) xi(n− 1) x2i (n) x2i (n− 1) xi(n)xi(n− 1)
xi(n− 1) xi(n− 2) x2i (n− 1) x2i (n− 2) xi(n− 1)xi(n− 2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xi(n−M + 1) xi(n−M) · · · · · · xi(n−M + 1)xi(n−M)


hi+ei
or equivalently:
Y i = Pihi + ei ; i = 1, 2.
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where ei : i = 1, 2, 3. is the estimation error.
The M × N matrices Pi, i = 1, 2, 3 can be determined easily from the vectors
X i, i = 1, 2, 3. A standard metric is to minimize the squared error:
|ei|2 = |Y i − Pihi|2, i = 1, 2, 3.
This is the classical Least-squares(LS) problem and the solution is:
hi,opt = P
†
i Y i, i = 1, 2, 3.
hi,opt = (P
H
i Pi)
−1PHi Y i, i = 1, 2, 3.
Now that we have the estimatedhi, i = 1, 2, 3.we should solve the classical decision
problem using the likelihood ratio:
Λ(h3) ,
Ph3|h1
(h3|h1)
Ph3|h2
(h3|h2)
On the other hand, given hi,
h3 = (P
H
3 P3)
−1PH3 Y i, i = 1, 2.
h3 = (P
H
3 P3)
−1PH3 P3hi + (P
H
3 P3)
−1PH3 ν3 = hi + (P
H
3 P3)
−1PH3 ν3, i = 1, 2.
If X is a Gaussian random vector, then so is AX + bfor any r × n vector A and any
r-vector b. Symbolically, we write:
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X ∼ N(m, C) ⇒ AX + b ∼ N(Am+ b, ACAH)
then:
Ph
3
|h
i
(h3|hi) =
1√
det(C)(2pi)
n
2
e−
1
2
(h
3
−h
i
)HC−1(h
3
−h
i
) (2.33)
where C is the covariance matrix and can simply be derived as:
C = ((PH3 P3)
−1PH3 ) ∗ σ2nIM×M ∗ ((PH3 P3)−1PH3 )H
C = σ2n(P
H
3 P3)
−1
Equation (2.33) yields:
Ph
3
|h
i
(h3|hi) =
1√
det(C)(2pi)
n
2
e
− 1
2σ2n
(h3−hi)
H (PH3 P3)(h3−hi) (2.34)
At the receiver the estimated Volterra coefficients h1 and h2, are stored and every time
an output vector Y 3 is received, we decode the corresponding X3 and estimate h3 using
the results of the LS problem. Then we calculate Λ(h3) and decide whether it was h1 or
h2:
e
− 1
2σ2n
(h3−h1)
H(PH3 P3)(h3−h1)
h1
≷
h2
e
− 1
2σ2n
(h3−h2)
H (PH3 P3)(h3−h2)
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Equivalently:
(h3 − h1)H(PH3 P3)(h3 − h1)
h2
≷
h1
(h3 − h2)H(PH3 P3)(h3 − h2)
Figure 2.5 shows the simulated probability of error versus the norm of the difference
vector for the classical likelihood ratio test algorithm. The GLRT performance curve is
also included for comparison reasons.
2.4 Volterra coefficients as random variables
In this section we consider the Volterra coefficients to be random variables with vari-
ance σ2h around their mean and run simulations to find the curves of Pe vs. the variance of
the coefficients(σ2h).
We also consider another algorithm which we call the naive algorithm in which our
naive detection system outputs the estimated coefficients vector hopt,i, i=1,2 which is clos-
est to the third estimated coefficients vector hopt,3 with theL2-norm criterion for measuring
the closeness:
||hopt,3 − hopt,2||
h2
≷
h1
||hopt,3 − hopt,1||
Figure 2.6 shows the performance of the GLRT algorithm, the classical likelihood ratio
algorithm and the naive algorithm in one figure. The classical likelihood ratio test has the
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Figure 2.6. Probability of error vs. the variance of the Volterra coefficients σ2h
best simulated results, while the GLRT has the greatest probability of error of the three.
The GLRT makes use of the whole data all at once , while in the other methods the Volterra
coefficients vector is determined first as described above.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING OF POWER AMPLIFIERS
In this chapter we will validate the use of Volterra series representation for the study
of nonlinear system components including power amplifiers and the possible sources of
variations in the Volterra series vector of different amplifiers.This way we will provide the
link between the theoretic analysis of the previous chapters and the practical anonymity
breaking application.
Behavioral modeling techniques provide a convenient and efficient means to predict
system-level performance without the computational complexity of full circuit simulation
or physics-level analysis of nonlinear systems, thereby significantly speeding up the analy-
sis process. General Volterra series based models have been successfully applied for radio
frequency (RF) power amplifier (PA) behavioral modeling. Working with Volterra series
presentations provides RF circuit designers with the insight that enables them to trace the
defects in their designs and modify the circuit parameters or the circuit elements. Many
instances of the use of Volterra series can be found in the literature for modeling and dis-
tortion calculation of nonlinear devices([42, 43, 40, 41, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53]), and
also studying the response of nonlinear systems to noise as in [44, 45, 46].
Weakly nonlinear systems are systems whose response to external inputs can be de-
scribed by a few terms in a functional series expansion such as a Volterra series. On the
31
other hand, excessively nonlinear systems like the class D power amplifiers have trans-
fer functions that cannot be well characterized by low order Volterra functional series.To
model the PA’s with strong nonlinearities and long memory effects, the general Volterra
model involves a great number of coefficients. In this respect, some simplified Volterra
series based models for RF power amplifiers have been proposed.
For our purpose of identification, if we consider no complexity limits, either weakly
or excessively nonlinear amplifiers like the class D amplifiers used in cellular phone trans-
mitters, could be characterized by enough Volterra series coefficients. It is important how
well Volterra series characterize amplifiers, as any model mismatch will affect the perfor-
mance of the the algorithm presented in previous chapter as it is based on the assumption
that a system is characterized by Volterra series representation. Fortunately the broad use
of Volterra series for modeling and studying amplifiers in the circuit community proves it
a suitable representation.
Next we need to determine how much variation there is between different amplifiers
of the same type. This will determine how well we are able to distinguish amplifiers
according to the Pe versus the norm of the difference vector curves derived.
3.1 Process Variations
To be able to validate the effectiveness of our anonymity breaking techniques, we need
to determine how the Volterra series presentations of power amplifiers, even though from
the same manufacturer, differ in practice by introducing one source of variation. Varia-
tions in fabrication process, ambient temperature and supply voltage affect the electrical
performance of the transistors. For example a higher temperature and a lower supply volt-
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age make the transistor operate slower.See Appendix B for a brief explanation of process
corners.
The first important source that makes different amplifiers in different transmitters have
distinct Volterra series coefficients which we could make use of to distinguish them is the
parameter variations in production. According to [54], MOS transistors of which the am-
plifier circuits are made always exhibit broad variations in major device parameters among
production lots. As a result, a wide range of devices are measured and parameters are ex-
tracted to characterize the statistical variations. The most notable parameter variations
include channel length, threshold voltage, and gate-oxide thickness variations. Additional
models are added to the model library based on the extremes of these key parameters.
These models are called process corners in that they capture parameters that make the
circuit unusually fast or unusually slow.
To show the variation of the Volterra series coefficients at these process corners, a
simple one-transistor class A amplifier was simulated. Given a sinusoidal input at the
frequency ω0 the output of the circuit was measured at frequencies ω0, 2ω0, 3ω0, and 4ω0.
From this data considering the simplified memoryless fourth order Volterra series represen-
tation, we derived these coefficients for the slow(worst performance, lowest power),nominal
(typical performance, typical power), and fast (best performance, highest power) NMOS
transistor. Figure 3.1 shows the simple amplifier simulated and the Tables 3.1, 3.2, and
3.3 show the output at frequencies ω0, 2ω0, 3ω0, and 4ω0 for the three typical, slow, and
fast corners of operation of the NMOS transistor in the amplifier circuit. In each case the
available source power Pavs is determined so that the optimum power is delivered to the
load. Corresponding estimated Volterra series coefficients are derived in Table 3.4. Now
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we can estimate the norm of the difference vector between the fast and slow corners which
are the±3σ of the limits of the bell curve of the probability density function from its mean.
The resulting L2-norm of the difference is 0.0390 which probability of error quite close to
zero. according to the Pe curves of chapter 2, we have a very low probability of error for
this norm of the difference vector.
Table 3.1. Typical NMOS corner
Pavs freq Typical NMOS
Pdel opt=0.23W Pdel opt @Pavs=9.95dBm
Pavs freq mag(vload)[40, ::] phase(vload)[40, ::]
10.00 1.90E+09 4.8073 -54.778
10.00 3.80E+09 0.0789 -105.760
10.00 5.70E+09 0.0053 82.483
10.00 7.60E+09 0.0010 101.338
Table 3.2. Slow NMOS corner
Pavs freq Slow NMOS
Pdel opt=0.23W Pdel opt @Pavs=10.653dBm
Pavs freq mag(vload)[43, ::] phase(vload)[43, ::]
10.75 1.90E+09 4.8215 -55.841
10.75 3.80E+09 0.0717 -105.394
10.75 5.70E+09 0.0099 75.561
10.75 7.60E+09 0.0023 94.778
In these simulations the temperature and supply voltage effects are not considered.
also, in practice class AB amplifiers are used in power amplifier circuits which are even
less nonlinear but more efficient which makes our study of class A amplifiers a worst case
analysis and results in a better probability of error.
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Figure 3.1. Class A amplifier circuit.
Table 3.3. Fast NMOS corner
Pavs freq Fast NMOS
Pdel opt=0.23W Pdel opt @9.246
Pavs freq mag(vload)[37, ::] phase(vload)[37, ::]
9.25 1.90E+09 4.7954 -53.298
9.25 3.80E+09 0.0771 -103.505
9.25 5.70E+09 0.0038 91.811
9.25 7.60E+09 0.0004 108.759
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Table 3.4. Estimated Volterra Series coefficients
Slow Typical Fast
h1 4.791829 4.79136 4.783927
h2 0.125176 0.149879 0.150715
h3 0.039517 0.02124 0.015336
h4 0.01832 0.007841 0.003528
Although the difference vector is computed between the ±3σ limits which is between
the extremes. In practice two devices can vary with some certain probability that can be
calculated from their bell curve.
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CHAPTER 4
BREAKING ANONYMITY IN THE LOW SNR CASE
In the previous chapters we have considered the high SNR case where the input was
decoded at the output and the anonymity breaking algorithms discussed assumed having
access to the input vector as well. Possible future work could be done in suggesting
anonymity breaking techniques and algorithms for the low SNR case. Here in this chapter
we only show from an information theoretic perspective that the output of a nonlinear sys-
tem conveys information about the system Volterra coefficients and thus hardware based
techniques could be devised for anonymity breaking purposes.
We will provide information theoretic formulas and bounds to the performance of the
physical layer anonymity breaking techniques explained in Chapter 1. Because of the
nonlinear nature of the formulas in this chapter, the multiple integrals in the formulas
rarely lead to neat formulations even with the simplest possible assumptions. But, for the
simplified case of the zero memory linear quadratic case and for the low signal to noise
ratio case, the closed form formulas are calculated.
4.1 Zero-memory Linear Quadratic System
Using the simplified Volterra series which only consists of the first convolution term(A.9)which
is the linear part and the second double summations(A.10), the quadratic part, what results
37
is called a linear quadratic form. In addition, we consider the zero memory case where the
Volterra series simply looks like Taylor series around point zero.
y(n) = h1(0)x(n) + h2(0, 0)x(n)
2 + ν(n) (4.1)
What we want to find is the the amount of (Shannon)information the output of the nonlinear
system has about the system parameters, which is the mutual information of the output and
system coefficients which in this case are h1(0) and h2(0, 0).Call the coefficients vector
h = [h1(0) h2(0, 0)]
T
. What we are actually interested in is how the mutual information
increases when we have access to more output points. Let’s consider the information of
one output about the system parameters, I(y(n);h):
I(y(n);h) = h(y(n))− h(y(n)|h) (4.2)
I(y(n);h) = h(h)− h(h|y(n)) (4.3)
We use equation (4.2) to calculate the mutual information as it is easier to deal with in our
case.
h(y(n)|h) = Eh(h(y(n)|h = H) (4.4)
where
h(y(n)|h = H) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f
y(n)|h=H(y(n)|h = H)log(fy(n)|h=H(y(n)|h = H))dy(n)
and Eh means expectation with respect to h.
h(y(n)) =
∫ +∞
−∞
fy(n)(y(n))log(fy(n)(y(n)))dy(n) (4.5)
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Thus, to be able to find h(y(n)) and h(y(n)|h) we first need to find fy(n)(y(n)) and
f
y(n)|h which are the probability density functions of y(n) and y(n) given h.
The input x(n) and the system coefficients are random variables. The input is a binary
random variable with equal probability for −1 and 1, and the system coefficients and
the additive noise are Gaussian random variables with mean zero and variances σ2h1 , σ
2
h2
,
and σ2n respectively. y(n) given h and x(n) is a Gaussian random variable with mean
h1(0)x(n) + h2(0, 0)x(n)
2 and variance σ2n. Given x(n), h
y(n) ∼ N(h1(0)x(n) + h2(0, 0)x(n)2, σ2n)
Or equivalently:
f
y(n)|h,x(n)(y(n)|h, x(n)) =
1√
2piσn
e
−
(y(n)−h1(0)x(n)−h2(0,0)x(n)
2)2
2σ2n (4.6)
and
f
y(n)|h(y(n)|h) = Ex(n)(
1√
2piσn
e
−
(y(n)−h1(0)x(n)−h2(0,0)x(n)
2)2
2σ2n ) (4.7)
fy(n)(y(n)) = Eh(Ex(n)(
1√
2piσn
e
−
(y(n)−h1(0)x(n)−h2(0,0)x(n)
2)2
2σ2n )) (4.8)
4.2 Low SNR approximation
In this section we use the results of [1]to find the mutual information for the case of
binary inputs. The author in [1] finds the capacity of the binary-input additive gaussian
noise channel:
Y = X + ν (4.9)
39
The capacity is the maximum amount of mutual information for different input probability
mass functions which is when the inputs −1 and 1 are equiprobable. For the low SNR
case, [1] finds:
I(X;Y ) = h(Y )− h(Y |X) (4.10)
Since H(Y) in [1] is the same as h(y(n)|h = H) for our problem, we can also easily find
h(Y |X) :
h(y(n)|h = H) = h(Y ) = I(X;Y ) + h(Y |X) = (4.11)
= log2(e)
h21
2σ2n
+ o(
h31
σ3n
)+EX(h(Y |X = x)) = log2(e) h
2
1
2σ2n
+EX(log2(e)+ log2(
√
2piσn))
(4.12)
= log2(e)
h21
2σ2n
+
1
2
log2(e) + log2(
√
2piσn) (4.13)
In our problem we have Y = h1(0)x(n) + h2(0, 0)x(n)2 + ν where x(n)2 = 1. As
Y = h1(0)(x(n) +
h2(0,0)
h1(0)
) + ν is the scaled shifted version of Y = X + ν, and also
as shifting does not change the amount of information, we just need to take into account
the scaling factor which shows itself as a h21 coefficient in I(X;Y ) and does not change
h(Y |X).
Therefore,
h(y(n)|h) = Eh(h(y(n)|h = H)) = log2(e)
σ21
2σ2n
+
1
2
log2(e) + log2(
√
2piσn) (4.14)
According to (4.1), given x(n)
y(n) ∼ N(0, σ2n + σ21x2n + σ22) (4.15)
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and as x(n) shows itself only in the form of x(n)2 = 1. Thus y(n) has the same pdf, and
the entropy for the normal random variables is simply:
h(y(n)) = log2(
√
2pi(σ2n + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)) +
1
2
log2(e) (4.16)
and finally the mutual information of the output and the zero memory linear quadratic
system parameters equals:
I(y(n);h) = h(y(n))− h(y(n)|h) = log2(
√
σ2n + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2
σn
)− log2(e) σ
2
1
2σ2n
(4.17)
In the equation 4.18 if we consider σ21 = σ22 and also if we call
σ21
σ2n
= x, then we will
have:
I(y(n);h) =
1
2
log2(
1 + 2x
ex
) (4.18)
For the low SNR case we have a lot of noise or equivalently large σ2n and thus 0 < x < 1
which results in I(y(n);h) > 0 which means the output has some non-zero information
about the system Volterra coefficients.
Now if we increase the number of outputs and form the vector of outputs:
Y = [y(n) y(n− 1) ... y(n−M + 1)]T
where
y(n− i) = h1(0)x(n− i) + h2(0, 0)2x(n− i)2 + ν , i = 0, ...,M − 1
41
and the vector of system parameters h = [h1(0) h2(0, 0)] Now as we considered the system
parameters known(deterministic) for finding h(y(n)|h = H), if we increase the number
of outputs, still y(n− i) given h are independent and thus:
h(Y |h) = Eh(h(Y |h =H)) = M(log2(e)
σ12
2σ2
+
1
2
log2(e) + log2(
√
2piσn)) (4.19)
But for finding I(Y ; h) we still need to find h(Y ) which is not as easy as y(n − i)’s are
not independent.
4.3 The General Case
The general input output relationship for a nonlinear system with limited memory L
and only considering the terms until and including the N-fold summations is of the form:
y(n) = ΣNr=1Σ
L−1
k1=0
...ΣL−1kr=0hr(k1, ..., kr)x(n− k1)...x(n− kr) (4.20)
= ΣL−1k1=0h1(k1)x(n− k1) (4.21)
+ΣL−1k1=0Σ
L−1
k2=0
h2(k1, k2)x(n− k1)x(n− k2) (4.22)
+...
+ΣL−1k1=0...Σ
L−1
kN=0
hN(k1, ..., kN)x(n− k1)...x(n− kN), (4.23)
and also after observing M output samples Y = [yn yn−1 ... yn−2]T , we will have:
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fY |h,X (y|h,x) =
1
(
√
2piσn)M
e
ΣM−1i=0
(y(n−i)−h1(0)x(n−i)−h2(0,0)x(n−i)
2)2
2σ2n (4.24)
This is because given x(n− i)’s and h y(n− i)’s are i.i.d. Gaussian.
fY |h(y|h) = Ex
(
1
(
√
2piσn)M
e
ΣM−1i=0
(y(n−i)−h1(0)x(n−i)−h2(0,0)x(n−i)
2)2
2σ2n
)
(4.25)
fY (y) = Eh
(
Ex
(
1
(
√
2piσn)M
e
ΣM−1i=0
(y(n−i)−h1(0)x(n−i)−h2(0,0)x(n−i)
2)2
2σ2n
))
(4.26)
h(Y ) =
∫ ∫
...
∫ +∞
−∞
fY (y)log2(fY (y))dy (4.27)
h(y|h = H) =
∫ ∫
...
∫ +∞
−∞
fY |h=H(y|h = H)log(fy|h=H(y|h = H))dy (4.28)
h(y(n)|h) = Eh(h(y(n)|h = H) (4.29)
To find neat formulations or bounds to the above equations we need to solve multi-
ple integrals of the function (4.25) or (4.24) which are fairly complicated functions the
integrals of which do not have closed form solutions.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, with the motivation of digital forensics and breaking anonymity, an ap-
proach to identify users is presented. The main idea is to make use of the minute imper-
fections in the different components of the transmitters’ hardware even for the case where
they are made by the same manufacturer.
First the feasibility and effectiveness of this approach is shown empirically by mea-
suring the output frequency of some oscillators from the same manufacturer.We saw that
although the two oscillators were low noise oscillators from the same manufacturer they
had different center frequencies and this difference could be deployed along with other
parameters to identify different users.
Next,for the high signal to noise ratio(SNR) case, where the input is fully recovered
at the receiver, two algorithms based on the generalized likelihood ratio test(GLRT) and
classical likelihood ratio test were proposed and the effectiveness of these algorithms was
shown by drawing the Pe versus the norm of the difference vector between the two sets
of system parameters. The nonlinear systems are presented by volterra series coefficients,
the appropriateness of which was addressed in the modeling chapter. Also one source of
the difference in Volterra series coefficients of different transmitters which is the process
variations and how it causes variations in the Volterra series representation of different
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power amplifiers was studied. In practice class AB amplifiers are used in the transmitter
systems which are more nonlinear than the class A amplifier studied.
Finally, for the low SNR case, only the fact that some certain amount of information
about the system coefficients from the output could be derived, was proved, leaving the
task of devising new algorithms capable of this to future researchers.
Future researches could be done by improvising new separation techniques for the low
SNR case. Also the apparent generalization of the introduced algorithms for the high SNR
case to the scenario where there are more than two possible users and the resulting perfor-
mance curves is another possible future research topic. Also, the possible countermeasures
and studying the susceptibility of our techniques to these possible countermeasures could
be done as another complementary research project.
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APPENDIX A
VOLTERRA SERIES REPRESENTATION
A linear, causal system with memory can be described by the convolution representa-
tion:
y(t) =
∫ +∞
−∞
h(τ)x(t− τ)dτ (A.1)
y(n) = Σ∞m=−∞h(m)x(n−m) (A.2)
where x(t) is the input, y(t) the output, and h(t) the impulse response of the system. A
nonlinear system without memory can be described with a Taylor series:
y(t) = Σ+∞n=1an[x(t)]
n (A.3)
y(n) = Σ+∞n=1an[x(n)]
n (A.4)
where, again, x(t) is the input and y(t) the output. The an are the Taylor series coefficients.
A Volterra series combines the above two representations to describe a nonlinear system
with memory:
y(t) = Σ∞n=1
1
n!
∫ +∞
−∞
du1...
∫ +∞
−∞
dungn(u1, ..., un)
n∏
r=1
x(t− ur) (A.5)
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=
1
1!
∫ +∞
−∞
du1g1(u1)x(t− u1) (A.6)
+
1
2!
∫ +∞
−∞
du1
∫ +∞
−∞
du2g2(u1, u2)x(t− u1)x(t− u2) (A.7)
+
1
3!
∫ +∞
−∞
du1
∫ +∞
−∞
du2
∫ +∞
−∞
du3g3(u1, u2, u3)x(t− u1)x(t− u2)x(t− u3) (A.8)
+...
x(t) is the input, y(t) is the output, and the gn(u1, ..., un) are called the Volterra kernels
of the system or simply the kernels . The ui are time variables. For n = 1, g1(u1) will
be recognized as the familiar impulse response (A.1); thus, gn for n > 1 are rather like
”higher-order impulse responses”. These serve to characterize the various orders of nonlin-
earity . The first few terms of (A.5) have been explicitly written out; (A.6) is the familiar
convolution integral (A.1), and (A.7) and (A.8) may be thought of as two-fold and three-
fold convolution. (A.5) is an infinite sum of n-fold convolution integrals. The leading
1
n!
is omitted by most authors.For causal systems the lower bound of all integrals equals
zero. Equation (A.9) shows the discrete-time version of (A.5),which we use throughout
this thesis:
y(n) = Σ∞r=1Σ
∞
k1=−∞
...Σ∞kr=−∞hr(k1, ..., kr)x(n− k1)...x(n− kr) (A.9)
= Σ∞k1=−∞h1(k1)x(n− k1) (A.10)
+Σ∞k1=−∞Σ
∞
k2=−∞
h2(k1, k2)x(n− k1)x(n− k2) (A.11)
+...
In the above equations for causal discrete-time systems the lower bound of the summations
becomes zero and for the systems with limited memory L, the upper bound of summations
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should be replaced with L. Also we can approximate a nonlinear system with an N th order
approximation having the sum of first i-fold summations where i ≤ N :
y(n) = ΣNr=1Σ
L−1
k1=0
...ΣL−1kr=0hr(k1, ..., kr)x(n− k1)...x(n− kr) (A.12)
= ΣL−1k1=0h1(k1)x(n− k1) (A.13)
+ΣL−1k1=0Σ
L−1
k2=0
h2(k1, k2)x(n− k1)x(n− k2) (A.14)
+...
+ΣL−1k1=0...Σ
L−1
kN=0
hN (k1, ..., kN)x(n− k1)...x(n− kN) (A.15)
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APPENDIX B
CMOS PROCESS CORNERS
Transistors have uncertainty in their process parameters and also due to environmental
variations. Variations towards a shorter Leff (effective channel length), lower Vt(threshold
voltage), and a thinner tox(oxide thickness) make the device faster and the device gets
slower if we have variations in the opposite direction. Also environmental variations like
higher VDD and lower temperature makes the device faster.
A process corner represents a three sigma(standard deviation) variation from nominal
doping concentrations (and other parameters) in transistors on a silicon wafer. This vari-
ation may occur for many reasons, such as minor changes in the humidity or temperature
changes in the clean-room between wafers, or due to the position of the die relative to the
center of the wafer. Apart from the typical corner, there are fast and slow corners, where
the carrier mobilities are higher and lower than normal, respectively.
According to the normal probability density function that characterizes the process,
fast and slow corners are considered within ±3σ of the mean, which makes it improba-
ble(with probability less than 1 percent) for them to be outside these values.
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Figure B.1. Normal probability distribution curve.
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